2022-04-29
Australia’s involvement in military pacts since World War II has not been a very happy experience. It is time to shift the emphasis to diplomacy and negotiation in addressing disagreements with other nations.
By Chris Johansen, Green Issue Co-editor
At the end of World War II relations between erstwhile allies against the Nazis, the western democracies and the Soviet Union, quickly fell apart. This was because of the realization by western democracies that the Soviet Union had essentially colonized, rather than liberated, central Europe (e.g. Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, etc.), and of increasing concern that the Soviet Union was developing nuclear weapons. This prompted the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a military alliance between most west European countries, USA and Canada. The Soviets did eventually develop nuclear capability in the early 1950s and this led to the 40-year long cold war, which ended with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. The only reason it didn’t morph into a hot war is that both sides grasped the concept of “mutually assured destruction” (MAD) – the mutual realization that both sides had enough nuclear weaponry to destroy the planet several times over.
Also after World War II, the Communist Party took over China and there were communist-inspired liberation movements in various Asian countries (e.g. Korea, Vietnam, Malaya, Indonesia). This prompted the formation of a “NATO” on the other side of the planet, named the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), aimed at stopping the spread of communism in Asia. SEATO, formed in 1954, actually only had two South East Asian countries as members – the Philippines and Thailand. The other members were Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan (really South Asian), USA, France and UK (the latter two being former major colonizers of South East Asia). Obvious South East Asian countries, Indonesia and Malaya (later Malaysia), were not members.
SEATO was primarily used by USA and Australia to promote the Domino Theory, that if communism prevailed in places like Vietnam then it would inevitably spread through South East Asia and beyond (even to Australia). This led to the military engagement in Vietnam in the 1960s, and later Cambodia, led by the USA, enthusiastically supported by Australia, half-heartedly so by the Philippines, Thailand and New Zealand and completely avoided by France, UK and Pakistan. And we all know the outcome of the Vietnam War. The Domino Theory proved to be a fizzer. The Vietnam War was really a liberation war against colonialism, to which the French admitted defeat in 1954 and the USA in 1975. SEATO disappeared into the ether soon after 1975.
Unlike SEATO however, NATO persisted, and even expanded, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. At the time I remember discussions with colleagues at the international centre where I was working. We all wondered why NATO remained if its only adversary, the Soviet Union, no longer existed. The continued existence of NATO has provided an excuse for a now authoritarian, imperialist Russia to invade Ukraine. Russia claims that its main reason for this invasion is the threat posed by NATO presence in countries bordering Russia. In hindsight, it would have been better if NATO had disbanded after 1991 and instead a “Marshall Plan” arrangement, as had happened for West Germany after WW II, implemented to assist former Soviet Union countries to transform into liberal democracies.
During World War II, particularly with Japan entering that war, Australia switched from UK to USA as its major military ally-cum-protector. After WW II, as the Cold War set in, Australia considered that it should formalize and strengthen its security arrangements with now superpower the USA. Thus the Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty (ANZUS or ANZUS Treaty) was formed in 1951. The objective was to agree that if there was an armed attack on any one member then the other members would come to its aid. Australia loyally obliged by, unthinkingly, joining US military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Again, that went well didn’t it?
However, New Zealand started playing truant from ANZUS in the 1980s, when they refused to let nuclear powered or armed ships into their territorial waters. The US was clearly not happy about this as New Zealand were effectively excluding much of the US Navy, so how could they possibly come to New Zealand’s aid if so required. Further, New Zealand has recently signed the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, to the further chagrin of the US.
So, ANZUS has effectively morphed into “AUS”, with Australia continuing to keep all of its security eggs in the US basket. But it remains one way traffic, with Australia willing to accede to any US request for military support but with uncertainty about the US response should Australia need military assistance. Noticeably since 2000, US administrations, particularly the Trump administration, have made it clear that the US puts its own interests at the forefront of any military engagement, and that “allies” can no longer assume that the US would jump to their aid should they be militarily threatened.
Fast forward to the present where new security arrangements involving Australia have cropped up, the Quad and AUKUS. Although not explicitly acknowledged, the purpose of these entities is clearly to contain any expansionist tendencies, and military threats, from China, in an intimidatory manner.
Firstly, the Quad, a security dialogue involving USA, Australia, Japan and India. Although each of these countries has various grievances with China, they are hardly in unison on other global issues. Most prominently, with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, India has come down on Russia’s side, due to its long-standing economic and military ties initially with the Soviet Union and then Russia – in stark contrast to the positions of US and Australia. India’s main reason for joining the Quad was wanting moral support in its recurring skirmishes with China along their border in the Himalayas (actually, due to extreme mountainous terrain and melting glaciers no-one really seems to know where the border is).
And then there was AUKUS, representing a reassembly of Anglo-Saxon imperialism – Australia, UK and USA. This grouping arose more out of internal politics than any military threat from China beyond what it was at the beginning of this century. Certainly in Australia, with declining popularity of the Coalition Government, that government decided to resort to that age-old ploy of drumming up an external threat so that they could claim to be protecting the population from it. Despite China being a major both-ways trading partner with Australia the Coalition Government has recently been ramping up its rhetoric against China concerning human rights abuses and threats against Taiwan. Although an impartial observer would agree that there are human rights abuses in China, for the Australian Government to so pontificate is like “the pot calling the kettle black”, when considering Australia’s record of treatment of indigenous peoples for 200+ years, prolonged torture of “illegal maritime arrivals”, failure to prosecute war crimes committed by the Australian military, etc. The China-Taiwan issue is really the remnants of a civil war of 60+ years ago, between the Nationalists and Communists, which I would suggest that both sides would ultimately like to settle peacefully, without foreign military involvement.
The practical upshot of Australia’s recent enhanced rhetoric against China is increased tariffs on, and even loss of, some of Australia’s exports to China. So, the first shot in this AUKUS-backed confrontation seems to be a shot into one’s own foot.
Another reason for Australia to have an “enemy” is its large and growing defence industry. As pointed out in the February 2022 publication Confronting State Capture, Australia’s defence industry, like the fossil fuel industry, has huge influence over Australian Government policies, including foreign policy, through its network of lobbyists, political donations, revolving doors between politics and the industry and personal contacts. The rhetorical question arises ‒ what is the point of expanding arms production if we don’t have an enemy to point them at?
Whether external military threats are real or concocted, surely the first, logical approach would be to try and negotiate, rather than a reflex action to “reach for the gun” as exemplified by Quad and AUKUS. Personally, I would assess that all of Australia’s stated grievances with China are amenable to negotiation. I say this on the basis of having been involved in negotiations regarding agricultural research and development projects in various countries across Asia and Africa. I found negotiations in China the easiest of all – Chinese counterparts were open to all manner of “foreign” ideas and concepts. But, admittedly, this is based on my experience of working in China some 40 years ago, when China was opening up after the inward looking “Cultural Revolution”. However, I assess that this openness to change, and hence to negotiation, has not changed very much in the intervening years, considering the huge social and economic transformations in China during that period.
In conclusion, Australia’s knee-jerk reaction to any perceived military threat so far has been to jump into a military alliance. This has not worked out well. SEATO led us into the disastrous Vietnam war and continued sycophancy towards the US led us into the equally disastrous Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts and makes us a sitting duck for any attacks on the US (Pine Gap, US base in Darwin, submarine base in Cockburn Sound, etc.). A first approach to dealing with disagreements with other nations should be negotiation, preferably facilitated by UN agencies which were established for this very purpose. Immediately falling back on or jumping into a military alliance only magnifies and escalates the original disagreement.
Header photo: British nuclear submarine HMS Triumph is silhouetted against the Middle Eastern sun. Source: UK Open Government Licence version 1.0
[Opinions expressed are those of the author and not official policy of Greens WA]