Nuked: A Synopsis

The AUKUS fiasco as documented by Andrew Fowler in his book “Nuked”

By Chris Johansen, Green Issue Co-editor

In the purchase of military hardware, especially that costing into the billions of dollars, there is a logical process to follow to achieve the desired outcome. The first step is a dispassionate and in-depth analysis of potential military threats into the future. Followed by a rationale analysis of the types of military hardware most appropriate to meet that threat. Then an open tendering process to identify the most cost effective means of procuring the best suited hardware. And then a solid contract, with minimal loopholes for reneging, for its procurement. Andrew Fowler has forensically documented how this process has been completely trashed by the Australian Government, and Opposition, in its intended procurement of nuclear powered submarines. The credibility of his analysis is backed by extensive access of “freedom of information” (FOI) documents (even if heavily redacted), interviews with many of the major players and thorough referencing.

The saga began with contemplation of how Australia should replace its Collins class submarines which were approaching their use-by-date. The “logical process”, as referred to above, did start off on the right foot – a search for subs whose primary role was to protect Australia’s coastline, as was the Collins’ role. A tender process between German, Japanese and French contenders resulted in the French Attack class (renamed from Barracuda class) submarine being chosen. The original design of this class was for it to be nuclear powered, but the design allowed for it to be conventionally powered by diesel-electric – but convertible to nuclear power should future owners so desire.

At A$50 billion, this was Australia’s biggest ever defence contract. Implementation was to be by French company Naval Group, with construction at Osbourne Shipyard South Australia. The first of 12 vessels was due to be completed by 2032, and delivery of the remainder through the 2030s. This meant extension of the Collins use-by-date by a few years, but this seemed feasible.

However, while these arrangements were in progress, during the period of Malcolm Turnbull’s prime ministership (2015-18), lurking in dark conservative corners of the Government and public service there were plans afoot to sink this particular submarine deal. These conservative forces had several gripes. They believed that any large military endeavour should remain within the Anglosphere and be consistent with their perceived role of the US being Australia’s security guarantor. And, historically, Anglophiles have never really trusted the French, even when allies, and never understood, nor tried to understand, French culture. But their immediate concern was how to oust Malcolm Turnbull, who was exhibiting too many symptoms of being a true “liberal”.

Exploiting historic Anglo-French misunderstandings, various conservatives began raising questions about contract details, pushing the French onto the back foot in trying to answer them. This process accelerated when Scott Morrison took over from Turnbull in 2018. The French made compromises but until the final days did not suspect that the entire contract was in danger of falling through.

Quite naturally, Australia’s prominent neocons see the neocons of US and UK as soulmates, resulting in many friendships and sharing of notes. For example, Scott Morrison had a close relationship with Trump’s Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Vice President Mike Pence, enhanced by the fact that they were all evangelical Christians. And Morrison also claimed to get on well with the then President Trump.

Through such neocon channels, the Americans made it very clear with what they wanted in terms of Australia’s defence policy. Firstly, they didn’t like the idea of the French having such a large influence on Australia’s military, fearing it may interfere with their own influence. Since World War 2, the US has considered Australia as primarily a proxy state. It hosts communication systems, at Pine Gap and North West Cape, vital to the US’s global military dominance. The Force Posture Agreement of 2015 legally authorizes the US to establish military bases in Australia – such as the air force base at Tindal, Northern Territory and the regular rotation of US troops through Darwin. And, the US had their eyes on HMAS Stirling Naval Base in Cockburn Sound WA as a most convenient location for porting their nuclear submarines patrolling the Indo-Pacific.

Although numbers of US ex-government and ex- or serving US military “consultants/advisers” on Australian Government assignments were increasing from 2013, they ramped up during the Morrison PMship. Thus US attitudes to China, and how best Australia could contribute to confronting that country, were made very clear to Australian Government officials – and their ears apparently remained wide open. Further, during this period, senior Government officials of US, UK and Australia secretly began chalking out an alternative scheme for replacing Australia’s aging submarine fleet. From the US point of view, Australia would need nuclear powered submarines if it was to join the US in confronting China – subs of high speed, long distance and time deployment capability, low detectability; able to sit off the coast of China, or coasts of any of other US enemies, indefinitely. Thus the AUKUS concept took shape, in deep secret.

But PM Morrison had an additional reason for pursuing AUKUS. In the run-up to the 2022 Federal election, Coalition polling was sinking. He employed that age-old trick to secure political dominance – invoke an enemy (irrespective of whether one exists) and claim to be the best person to protect the electorate from that enemy. Hence the ramped up anti-Chinese rhetoric to be followed by the announcement of a block-busting defensive initiative as election day approaches.

Andrew Fowler sums up Morrison’s role in creating AUKUS as: “the huge shift in Australia’s foreign policy alignment was hatched by a Christian fundamentalist former tourism marketing manager with no training in strategic or foreign affairs but a great gift for secrecy and deception.”

Morrison rang opposition leader Anthony Albanese and Emmanual Macron on 15 September 2021, the day before the AUKUS was announced, to inform that the Naval Group contract was cancelled and AUKUS would take its place – a shock for both Labor and the French. Later when asked if he thought Morrison had been lying to him Macron gave his now famous reply: “I don’t think … I know”.

Labor were absolutely wrong-footed and wedged by this announcement. If they raised any objection they could be characterized as weak on defence, an Achilles heel in Australian politics. They remain haunted by the Whitlam dismissal in 1975, basically prompted by his querying of what was going on at Pine Gap. These fears persisted even when Labor was elected to Government in 2022, and even despite huge objections to AUKUS within party ranks. A brilliant wedge inserted by the Coalition.

Basically, what does AUKUS involve?

• Increased porting, involving servicing and maintenance, of US and UK nuclear submarines at HMAS Stirling.
• Australia’s purchase of 3-5 second hand Virginia class nuclear subs from the US in the 2030s.
• Building of up to 5 AUKUS nuclear submarines of UK design but eventual construction at Osbourne Shipyard, deliverable from the 2040s.
• The above at a projected cost of A$ 368 billion.
• AUKUS pillar II involving advanced technologies in electronic and maritime warfare.

But, simultaneously opening a can of worms, with few satisfactory answers so far to the questions raised, some of which are:

• Will the US release its nuclear submarine secrets, currently shared only with the UK, to another country?
• In view of its backlog in submarine construction, will the US be willing to sell Virginia class submarines to Australia by the early 2030s?
• With the development of undersea surveillance and drone technology, will such submarines be obsolete by the 2040s?
• How to train sufficient personnel to the high skill levels needed for maintenance and operation of nuclear submarines, starting from scratch?
• To what extent will the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT) be breached and a pathway to nuclear weapons be opened?
• How will this affect Australia’s relations with other nations in the Indo-Pacific, particularly our major trading partner China, in whose direction all of this hardware is aimed?
• How is AUKUS just not another step in handing over Australia’s sovereignty to the US?
• What to do with nuclear waste produced, from US, UK and Australian nuclear subs?
• Has a cost-benefit analysis been done to assess whether this is an optimum way of spending A$ 368 billion of taxpayer money?
• And many more questions being pursued by anti-AUKUS activists.

Of course, anti-AUKUS activism only began after AUKUS was announced in September 2021, simply because the machinations leading up to it were effectively kept secret until then. Many of us in that activism were dumbfounded as to how all of this could have come about, when the French deal seemed settled. We thank Andrew Fowler for going into the details of those machinations to provide the context of how AUKUS evolved, and further expose its irrationality.

However, due to all of the still dangling loose ends, the future evolution of AUKUS is unpredictable. This is made even more so by the election of Trump II: will he invoke MAGA to prevent export of US nuclear submarine technology to another country, causing AUKUS to fall through, or will he instigate war with China, making HMAS Stirling a prime target? Tighten your seat belts for a wild AUKUS ride!

_{[Opinions expressed are those of the author and not official policy of Greens WA]}